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TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK: THE DEFEND 
TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016 AND WHY THE COMPUTER 
FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT OF 1984 STILL MATTERS FOR 
TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION 
 
Patrick J. Manion 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Trade secrets are a form of intellectual property provided legal protection 
due to their independent economic value. What material satisfies as a “trade secret” 
depends on the jurisdiction where relief is sought and which law is applied. However, 
generally a trade secret is information—including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique or process.1 Until recently, trade secrets were 
unique among the various forms of intellectual property because they were not af-
forded federal protection.2 Indeed, today trade secret misappropriation is primarily 
addressed through state versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, as well as the 
common law.3 Trade secret theft costs the United States economy between $300 and 
$480 billion a year.4 Fights over valuable trade secret theft have ensnared some of 
the largest and most recognizable names in U.S. industry.5 In recognition of this 
growing concern, Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 with over-
whelming bipartisan support in May of 2016.6 The legislative intent of the Act was 
 
1 See Trade Secret, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A formula, process, device, or other business 
information that is kept confidential to maintain an advantage over competitors; information — including a 
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process — that (1) derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known or readily ascertainable by others who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) is the subject of reasonable efforts, under the circum-
stances, to maintain its secrecy.”).  
2 In contrast, federal laws existed which protected trademarks, patents, and copyrights. 
3 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) and RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).    
4 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2 (2016).  
5 See, e.g., Siobhan Hughes, Senate Passes Trade-Secrets Bill, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (Apr. 4, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-passes-trade-secrets-bill-1459807973 (“DuPont Co. spent six years on a 
trade-secrets case involving Kevlar, a fiber used in bulletproof vests. In that case, DuPont enlisted the Justice 
Department’s help to go after Kolon Industries Inc., alleging that it had recruited former DuPont employees in 
to steal technological know-how that took DuPont decades to develop. The companies ultimately settled about 
a year ago, with Kolon agreeing to pay DuPont $275 million in restitution.”). 
6 Office of the Clerk of The United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 172, (Apr. 
27, 2016), http://clerk.house.gov/floorsummary/floor.aspx?day=20160427&today=20170225. 
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to clarify conflicting state laws regarding trade secret misappropriation and to pro-
vide a new federal civil cause of action for aggrieved parties.7 Prior to passage of the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act, aggrieved parties had to rely on an independent basis for 
federal jurisdiction or contort their claim to satisfy elements of a cause of action under 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 
or general criminal statutes.  
The Economic Espionage Act and general criminal statutes are often ineffective. 
For example, while the Economic Espionage Act “makes it a Federal criminal offense 
to misappropriate a trade secret that has an interstate or foreign nexus … [the Act] 
does not give trade secret owners a private right of action in Federal court.”8 There-
fore, a party asserting a claim under the Economic Espionage Act must rely on the 
Federal Government to criminally prosecute the case, and “while economic espio-
nage and the theft of trade secrets is a top priority for federal law enforcement, crim-
inal enforcement remains a limited solution to stopping trade secret theft as the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice are limited in the resources 
they can bring to bear.”9 Another option is to bring a trade secret misappropriation 
claim under state law. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
some version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act; however, state variations in the ap-
plication of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act have led to inconsistent outcomes across 
jurisdictions.10 This is where the Defend Trade Secrets Act becomes relevant by af-
fording a new means for private parties to obtain federal jurisdiction. This allows 
them to bypass the foibles of conflicting state law without the burden of providing an 
independent basis for federal jurisdiction or having to use the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, the Economic Espionage Act, or general criminal statutes.  
 While the contours of the Defend Trade Secrets Act are still being shaped as 
courts embrace this new law, two recent opinions have highlighted an interesting 
 
7 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 3 (2016).  
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 See ALA. CODE § 8-27-1 (1975) et seq., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.910 et seq., ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-401 
et seq., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601 et seq., CAL. <UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT CODE> § 3426 et 
seq., COL. REV. STAT. § 7-74-101, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-50 et seq., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2001 et seq., 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-501 et seq., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 688.001 et seq., GA. CODE ANN.  § 10-1-760 et seq., 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482B-1 et seq., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-801 et seq., Ill. ANN. STAT. ch. 140 Secs. 
351-59, IND. CODE ANN.  § 24-3-1-8, 1990 90 Acts, ch. 1201 Section 550.1 et seq., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3320 et seq., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.880 et seq., LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1431 et seq., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 10, § 1541 et seq., MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW § 11-1201 et seq., MICH. COP. LAWS ANN. § 
445.1901 et seq., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 235C.01 et seq., MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-26-1 et seq., MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 417.467, MONT. CODE ANN. § .30-14-401 et seq., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-501 et seq., NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 600A.010 et seq., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-B:1 et seq., N.J STAT. ANN. § 56:15-1 S-et seq., N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 57-3A-1 et seq., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 66-152 et seq., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 25.1-01 et 
seq., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.61 et seq., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, § 86 et seq., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 646.461 et seq., 12 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5392 et seq., tit. 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-41-1 et 
seq., S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-1 et seq., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-29-1 et seq., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-
1701 et al., Title 6 CH 134A et al., UTAH CODE ANN. §13-24-1 et seq., VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 et seq., 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108.010 et seq., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-22-1 et seq., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90, 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-101.  
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interplay between the Act and state non-compete policies.11 Specifically, the reme-
dies section of the Defend Trade Secrets Act states that an injunctive order under the 
Act will not conflict with state laws that prohibit restraints on trade.12 This is im-
portant because a trade secret misappropriation claim is often brought in conjunction 
with a claim for violation of a non-compete agreement or is brought seeking an in-
junction that will operate as a constructive non-compete on the former employer—
measures that amount to a restraint on trade, which may be prohibited under the De-
fend Trade Secrets Act. Moreover, the scope of injunctive relief sought by an ag-
grieved party may include restraining the employment of a separated employee. 
Thus, injunctive relief, a plaintiff’s preferred remedy, may be harder to obtain under 
the Defend Trade Secrets Act even though the purported goal of the Act was to har-
monize the application of trade secret law. Indeed, the principal argument made by 
proponents of a federal trade secret remedy was the goal of uniformity.13 This Note 
argues that the Defend Trade Secret Act falls short of this goal by offering a state 
carve-out that limits the scope of injunctive relief available, leaving the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act as an attractive option in certain jurisdictions that disfavor or 
prohibit restraints on trade and in factual scenarios where the trade secret has been 
accessed electronically. This proposition has growing relevance, as one of President 
Obama’s final policy initiatives was a call to action regarding the overuse and abuse 
of non-compete provisions.14  
 This Note is divided into two parts which detail the history, application, and 
interplay between various trade secret misappropriation remedies. Part I of this Note 
examines existing means by which to address trade secret misappropriation and the 
various pitfalls of each. Part I is divided into three sections. The first section of Part 
I examines the background and application of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as well 
as its common law origins. The second section of Part I examines the background 
and historical application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 as both an 
 
11 See, e.g., Panera, LLC v. Nettles, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101473, 2016 WL 4124114 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016) 
(granting a temporary restraining order and concluding the plaintiff was likely to succeed on merits of DTSA 
claim); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, 191 F.Supp.3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. June 2016) (denying in part a preliminary 
injunction on basis that injunctive relief would violate California policy disfavoring restraints on trade).  
12 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(3)(A)(i)(I-II) (2016) (“In a civil action brought under this subsection with respect to the 
misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may…grant an injunction…to prevent any actual or threatened mis-
appropriation described in paragraph (1) on such terms as the court deems reasonable, provided the order does 
not …prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and that conditions placed on such em-
ployment shall be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the 
person knows; or… otherwise conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a 
lawful profession, trade, or business...”). 
13 See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769 (2009) (“The dominant failure of a state-based trade secret regime is that trade 
secret law differs from state to state. Consequently, the most obvious benefit of [a federal trade secret statute] 
is that it will instantly accomplish what the common law, Restatement, UTSA, and Economic Espionage Act 
have all failed to achieve-- uniformity, both substantive and procedural.”). 
14 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: The Obama Administration An-
nounces New Steps to Spur Competition in the Labor Market and Accelerate Wage Growth, (Oct. 25, 2016) 
(“Today, the Administration put out a call to action and set of best practices for state policymakers to enact 
reforms to reduce the prevalence of non-compete agreements that are hurting workers and regional econo-
mies.”). 
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anti-hacking statute and as a means of federal jurisdiction for trade secret misappro-
priation claims when the information alleged to have been misappropriated was done 
so by electronic means. Lastly, the third section of Part I examines the background 
and application of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.  
Part II of this Note transitions to a discussion of the Defend Trade Secrets Act. 
Specifically, Part II is divided into two sections, which detail the background of the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act, recent application of the Act, and interaction between the 
Act and state non-compete provisions. I conclude by arguing that the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act may be a more attractive remedy for trade secret misappropriation 
claims considering recent state and federal trends disfavoring non-compete covenants 
and in light of the state non-compete carve out provisions of the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act.  
I. EXISTING MEANS BY WHICH TO ADDRESS TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION 
A. Background and Application of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have enacted some version of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act. States that have not adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act follow common law principles that are similar to the general principles expressed 
in the Act. As background, the common law principles regarding trade secret misap-
propriation are best identified in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.15 In 
a common law district, a plaintiff must establish three elements to prevail on a trade 
secret misappropriation claim: (1) a plaintiff must establish the existence of a trade 
secret; (2) a plaintiff must establish that the defendant has acquired knowledge of the 
trade secret as a result of a confidential relationship with the plaintiff; and (3) a plain-
tiff must establish that the defendant has made unauthorized use or disclosure of the 
trade secret.16  
With respect to the first element of a common law trade secret claim, drafters of 
comment B to § 757 of the Restatement of Torts acknowledged it was not possible 
to come up with an exact definition. Instead, they listed six factors courts typically 
consider when evaluating whether something is a trade secret: 
 
(1) [t]he extent to which the information is known outside of his busi-
ness; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others 
involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to 
guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the infor-
mation to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or 
money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease 
or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired 
or duplicated by others. 
 
 
15 RESTATEMENTS (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“A trade secret is any infor-
mation that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and 
secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”). 
16 Id.  
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This is not a dispositive test but rather a list of factors courts can and do consider 
when establishing the first element of a trade secret claim—whether there was a 
proper trade secret to protect in the first place. The Restatement § 757 factors are 
important because they have continued to be referenced by courts in jurisdictions that 
have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.17 One reason courts may continue to 
rely on the Restatement factors is the inherent difficulty of defining trade secrets in 
an increasingly complex technological landscape. A second reason may be that the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act definition is simply lacking. Indeed, the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act defines “trade secret” as: 
 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic 
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject 
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its se-
crecy.18 
 
Although this definition incorporates aspects of the Restatement § 757 factors, it 
does not provide as many independent factors for a court to consider and rely upon. 
Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a trade secret must have independent economic 
value and be subject to reasonable security measures. A Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
trade secret definition does not afford judges the same comfortable amount of leeway 
as that provided under the Restatement. 
In order for a Uniform Trade Secrets Act claim to be actionable, there must have 
been a "misappropriation." The Uniform Trade Secrets Act describes several types 
of conduct and defines "misappropriation" as: 
 
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has 
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; 
or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or 
implied consent by a person who (A) used improper means to acquire 
knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the time of disclosure or use, 
knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was 
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means 
to acquire it; (II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III) derived from or through a 
person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its se-
crecy or limit its use; or (C) before a material change of his [or her] 
position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that 
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.19 
 
 
17 See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Although 
the Act explicitly defines a trade secret…Illinois courts frequently refer to six common law factors (which are 
derived from § 757 of the Restatement (First) of Torts) in determining whether a trade secret exists.”). 
18 Uniform Law Commission Annual Conference, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act With 1985 Amendments, 
Uniform Law Commission, (Aug. 2-9, 1985). http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20se-
crets/utsa_final_85.pdf. 
19 Id. at 3-4  
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The Uniform Trade Secrets Act definition of “misappropriation” does not define 
“improper means.” However, courts applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act have 
generally held improper means to include: misrepresentation, breach or inducement 
of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, theft, and bribery. In a comment to the Act, 
the drafters defined “proper means” as independent invention, reverse engineering, 
discovery under a license from the owner of the trade secret, observation of the item 
in public use or on public display, and obtaining the trade secret from published lit-
erature.20   
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act was completed by the Uniform Law Commission 
in 1979 and amended in 1985.21  The goal of the Uniform Law Commission members 
is “to research, draft and promote enactment of uniform state laws in areas of state 
law where uniformity is desirable and practical.”22  Ironically, the goal of the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act was to address gaps in the common law and to provide uni-
form remedies across state lines.23 Unfortunately, this goal was thwarted over the 
years by variances in judicial interpretation and application of the law. This lack of 
uniformity has caused problems for attorneys litigating trade secret claims and busi-
nesses seeking to protect valuable trade secrets in their ordinary course of business. 
David Almeling, an IP attorney for the law firm O’Melveny & Myers, wrote an article 
in 2009 advocating for a federal trade secrets law. In his article, Almeling noted the 
following critiques about the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, “among the forty-six states 
that have enacted it, differences remain because legislatures in those states have mod-
ified the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and courts in those states have adopted different 
interpretations.” 24 Almeling goes on to explain that: 
 
[t]hese modifications and interpretations…include fundamental differ-
ences about what constitutes a trade secret, what is required to misap-
propriate it, and what remedies are available. Finally, even in instances 
where states have enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, many state 
courts continue to rely on their own common law instead of…the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act.25 
 
Ironically, the point of Almeling’s article is to advocate for a federal trade secret 
law to provide the uniformity lacking with the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act he so deftly critiques. Unfortunately, as will be explored, the newly enacted De-
fend Trade Secrets Act leaves much to be desired in this regard.   
 
 
20 Id. at 5-6.  
21 About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?ti-
tle=About%20the%20- ULC (explaining that the Uniform Law Commission is a coalition of “practicing law-
yers, judges, legislators and legislative staff and law professors, who have been appointed by state governments 
as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands”). 
22 About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?ti-
tle=About%20the%20- ULC 
23 Why States Should Adopt the UTSA, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narra-
tive.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20UTSA. 
24 Almeling, supra note 13, at 773-74.  
25 Id. at 774. 
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B. Background and Historical Application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (CFAA) was passed by Congress 
to address concerns in the 1980s regarding the cyber security of federal computers 
and information networks.26 Importantly, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is not 
a trade secret law and was never intended to serve as a federal corollary to the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act. However, in the initial years after passage, the law was 
amended multiple times. These amendments were always limited to the narrow scope 
of the law’s original intent—to protect computers, “involving a compelling federal 
interest.”27  
However, in 1994 Congress amended the law to allow, “any person who suffered 
damage by a statutory violation to ‘maintain a civil action against the violator to ob-
tain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.’”28 This set 
of amendments was codified at 18 U.S.C. 1030(g) and provided a new federal civil 
remedy.29 Additionally, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5) was amended to protect computers and 
computer systems from both outside and inside actors.30  Specifically, the section 
prohibited an individual who "intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer 
without authorization, and…alters, damages, or destroys information in any such 
Federal interest computer….”31 
In 1996, the Act was amended again to broaden the scope of the law.  For exam-
ple, “[while the] 1994 version of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A), included the phrase 
‘through means of a computer used in interstate commerce or communications’; this 
qualifying phrase was deleted in a 1996 amendment.”32 Additionally, the phrase “fed-
eral interest computer” was replaced with “protected computer.”33  These amend-
ments are consistent with a general broadening of the law to include all computers, 
not just those with a federal interest, as originally designated under the Act.  
Consistent with the legislative intent of the Act, the law was originally used to 
address hacking and computer crime. However, as the Act evolved to fit the rapidly 
changing technological landscape it also became a means of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction for trade secret misappropriation when that misappropriation occurred by 
electronic means.34 Using the Act as a vehicle for federal subject matter jurisdiction 
 
26 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030),174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 (2001). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 18 U.S.C. 1030(g). 
30 Buckman, supra note 26. 
31 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1994).  
32 See Buckman, supra note 26. 
33 See Buckman, supra note 26. 
34 Although at first glance this seemingly conflicts with the purported goal of the newly passed Defend Trade 
Secrets Act, the means by which to address trade secret misappropriation under the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act required that the trade secret misappropriation occur by electronic means. While this was a growing means 
by which trade secrets were misappropriated it nevertheless still left physical misappropriation of trade secrets 
by more conventional means without a federal remedy, thereby creating the need for the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act.  
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for trade secret misappropriation highlighted the evolving dichotomy between “in-
side” and “outside” actors with respect to the original intent of the law. Historically, 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was viewed as an “anti-hacking” statute35 and 
therefore applied to outside actors who “exceeded authorized access” or acted “with-
out access” under the terms of the statute.36  Specifically, the statute uses the phrase 
“without access” ten times and the phrase “exceeds authorized access” four times to 
refer to actors in violation of the statute.37 However, in the trade secret context, most 
claims involve a departing employee. Thus, the question became whether or not the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act covered internal misappropriation of trade secrets by 
electronic means or only outside actors who fit the more traditional description and 
legislative intent of preventing hackers. One case that explores this question is 
Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.38 
In Shurgard Storage, the District Court for the Western District of Washington 
held that “employees were ‘without authorization’ to access information from their 
employer's computers when they began to appropriate the employer's trade secrets 
for the benefit of the competitor.”39  In that case, Shurgard sued Safeguard under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for trade secret misappropriation when Eric Leland, 
a departing Shurgard employee, “sent e-mails to the defendant [Safeguard] contain-
ing various trade secrets and proprietary information belonging to the plaintiff 
[Shurgard].”40 Leland went on to accept employment with Safeguard. Shurgard ar-
gued for purposes of the statute that although Leland had access to the information 
while employed by Shurgard, he “exceeded” this access when he became an agent 
for Safeguard. Conversely, Safeguard claimed that Leland could not “exceed” access 
when it was already granted to him by Shurgard as part of his normal employment 
with Shurgard.41 The court accepted Shurgard’s interpretation of “exceeds authorized 
access” and in the process laid the early framework for a circuit split regarding how 
courts interpret when an employee exceeds authorized access.42 Regarding applica-
tion of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in Shugard, Deborah Buckman said,  
 
The court applied principles of agency law to conclude that the employ-
ees' authorized access to the employer's computers ended at the moment 
when they became agents of the competitor and began appropriating in-
formation from the employer's computer for the competitor's benefit. 
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the Act applied 
only to "outsiders" or "hackers" and was inapplicable to inside employ-
ees, noting that its express language refers to anyone who intentionally 
 
35 See e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 98-894 (1984).  
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994). 
37 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
38 Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).  
39 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030),174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 (2001). 
40 Shurgard Storage, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 125 (“Under this rule, the authority of the plaintiff's former employees ended when they allegedly 
became agents of the defendant. Therefore, for the purposes of this 12(b)(6) motion, they lost their authorization 
and were ‘without authorization’ when they allegedly obtained and sent the proprietary information to the de-
fendant via e-mail.”). 
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accesses a protected computer. The court acknowledged that the original 
scope of the statute may have been interpreted as so limited, but pointed 
out that its subsequent amendments broadened the scope sufficiently to 
cover the behavior alleged in this case.43 
 
The Shurgard court highlighted the dichotomy between inside and outside em-
ployees and broadened the scope of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to apply not 
just as an anti-hacking statute for outside actors but also to internal, departing em-
ployees. This distinction was further emphasized in a subsequent case, Int'l Airport 
Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin.44  
In Citrin, Jacob Citrin served as an employee for International Airport Centers 
(“International Airport”), a real estate development corporation involved in the ac-
quisition of airport real estate.45 Citrin decided to leave International Airport and start 
a competing business. While in the process of leaving International Airport, Citrin 
deleted all the data off his company-issued laptop before handing in the computer. 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit drew on the agency principles espoused 
by the Shurgard Storage court when it said, “Citrin's breach of his duty of loyalty 
terminated his agency relationship…and with it his authority to access the laptop, 
because the only basis of his authority had been that relationship.”46 This judicial 
trend toward applying agency principles to determine when an employee “exceeded 
authorized access” or acted “without access” was not meant to last. In 2012, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected Citrin in United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(“Nosal”). In the Nosal case, David Nosal was an employee of Korn Ferry – a Los 
Angeles-based executive search and advisory firm. Nosal decided to leave Korn 
Ferry and start his own competing firm.47 After leaving Korn Ferry, Nosal convinced 
some of his former colleagues who were still working for Korn Ferry to help him 
start a competing business. Nosal’s fellow employees used their Korn Ferry computer 
login information to access and download source lists, names and contact information 
from a confidential database on the company's computer system, and then transferred 
that information to Nosal to help start the competing business.48 In that case, the em-
ployees who were still working for Korn Ferry were authorized to access the data-
base, but Korn Ferry had a policy that prohibited disclosing confidential infor-
mation.49 Nosal was indicted on twenty counts, including trade secret theft. Using 
Citrin, the court could have applied agency principles and reasoned that misappro-
priation had taken place under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act because the em-
ployees Nosal solicited had stopped acting for Korn Ferry when they surreptitiously 
conveyed confidential information to Nosal in breach of their duty of loyalty. Instead, 
 
43 See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030),174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 (2001). 
44 Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
45 Id. at 419. 
46 Id. at 420–21 (quoting Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 
1123, 1125). 
47 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, “[T]he CFAA does not cover an em-
ployee-hacker or an insider that takes data and uses it in an anticompetitive manner 
after leaving the company.” 50  The Nosal ruling laid the groundwork for a circuit 
split.  
Three months later, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit Nosal opin-
ion in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller (“WEC”).51 In WEC, defendant 
Mike Miller worked for WEC – a specialty welding company in South Carolina. 
WEC brought suit against Miller and his assistant for downloading confidential in-
formation to a personal laptop in preparation for a planned departure to a WEC com-
petitor.52 In that case, the court held that “the CFAA is not violated unless an em-
ployee lacks any authorization to obtain or alter the data when he or she was 
employed.” 53   Conversely, “the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh circuits take the 
opposite view and support the concept that an employee-hacker violates the CFAA 
whether he or she uses the data with or without financial gain.”54 
Thus the circuit split regarding an employee’s scope of “authorization” and 
whether it applies to inside and outside actors equally evolved from these cases and 
remains in controversy. This uncertainty and un-reconciled disparity regarding inter-
pretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is one of the main limiting factors 
associated with using the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as a vehicle for remedying 
trade secret misappropriation. However, as is discussed in Part III of this Note, the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act still has significant advantages over the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act despite this limitation.  
C. History and Application of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (“EEA”) is divided into two sections.55 
The law created two new federal criminal offenses for the theft of trade secrets. First, 
 
50 Robert C. Kain, Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Employee Hacking Legal in California and Vir-
ginia, but Illegal in Miami, Dallas, Chicago, and Boston, 87 FLA. BAR J. 36 (2013).  
51 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).   
52 Id. at 201-02. 
53 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).     
54 Id.  
55 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 states: “‘(a) IN GENERAL- Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense 
will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly-‘(1) steals, or without 
authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade 
secret;‘(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, 
destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret;‘(3) 
receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or 
converted without authorization;‘(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through 
(3); or ‘(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) 
through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as 
provided in subsection (b), be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. ‘(b) 
ORGANIZATIONS- Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not 
more than $10,000,000.” Meanwhile, Section 1832 states, “‘(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, 
that is related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce, to the 
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure 
any owner of that trade secret, knowingly-- ‘(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries 
away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information; ‘(2) without authorization copies, 
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“[s]ection 1831 of the EEA, titled “Economic Espionage,” criminalizes acts done 
with the intent to benefit any foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.” 
56  Meanwhile, “[s]ection 1832 of the EEA, titled ‘Theft of Trade Secrets,’ pertains 
to domestic acts and makes the same conduct described in section 1831 a crime re-
gardless of whether the theft is meant to benefit a foreign government.”57 Im-
portantly, “[s]ection 1832 differs from section 1831 by including stipulations that the 
goal of the misappropriation is to harm the owner of the trade secret and to econom-
ically benefit someone other than the owner of the trade secret.”58 Significantly, the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 as introduced was solely a federal criminal statute; 
therefore, the only party that had standing to bring a suit under the Economic Espio-
nage Act of 1996 was the Federal Government. This was perhaps the main limitation 
(although there were others59) regarding use of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
to redress trade secret misappropriation. Regardless, the law was passed to address a 
growing concern by the government that foreign actors were committing economic 
espionage against U.S. companies and was meant to (again) standardize application 
of trade secret misappropriation law.60 Recognizing the limitations of the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996 to adequately address trade secret misappropriation, the De-
fend Trade Secrets Act emerged as a means to yet again standardize application of 
trade secret misappropriation law and provide a new, private federal cause of action 
for aggrieved parties.  
 
 
duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, trans-
mits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such information; ‘(3) receives, buys, or possesses such 
information, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authoriza-
tion; ‘(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3); or ‘(5) conspires with one or 
more other persons to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such 
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. ‘(b) Any organization that commits any offense 
described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $5,000,000. 
56 Spencer Simon, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305, 310 (1998). 
57 Id. 
58 Id.  
59 See id. (“The EEA does not protect trade secrets related to services (as opposed to goods), negative know-
how, or reverse engineering. Furthermore, it does not address the needs of U.S. corporations operating abroad 
from trade secret theft. It also fails to adequately address the rights of victims for monetary loss sustained as a 
result of the theft and misappropriation of their trade secrets. To qualify under section 1832, trade secrets must 
be “related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce.” Because 
trade secrets explicitly must be embodied in a product in the stream of commerce, protection is limited if the 
trade secret relates to a rendering of services rather than a produced ware that contains or uses the secret.”). 
60 See e.g., id. (“The problem of foreign economic espionage has grown significantly since the end of the Cold 
War. Testifying before joint hearings by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information for the EEA's passage 
in early 1996, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Louis Freeh stated that the Bureau's investigations of 
economic espionage cases had doubled in the previous year from 400 to 800, and twenty-three countries had 
been involved. He claimed that foreign governments are actively targeting U.S. industry and the U.S. govern-
ment to steal “critical technologies, data, and information in order to provide their own industrial sectors with 
a competitive advantage.” According to Freeh and other law enforcement officials, former military spies have 
been redeployed by foreign governments to the commercial world, presumably ready to use their skills in other 
ways. The loss to U.S. industry from foreign economic espionage is estimated at nearly $100 billion per year.) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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II. THE BACKGROUND AND APPLICATION OF THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT AND 
INTERPLAY WITH STATE NON-COMPETE PROVISIONS 
 A. Background and Legislative Intent  
According to the United States Senate Report, the Defend Trade Secrets Act 
(DTSA) was passed in order to harmonize variances in state application of trade se-
cret law.61 Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have passed some version 
of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).62 However, state application of the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act has been anything but uniform. Inconsistent application of 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act by the states has led to a confusing landscape for 
businesses and employers to navigate an economy that is increasingly unbound by 
traditional geographic limitations. For example, the Senate Report acknowledged the 
impact of this variation among state law versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
stating,  
 
[a]lthough the differences between State laws and the UTSA are gener-
ally relatively minor, they can prove case-dispositive: they may affect 
which party has the burden of establishing that a trade secret is not read-
ily ascertainable, whether the owner has any rights against a party that 
innocently acquires a trade secret, the scope of information protectable 
as trade secret, and what measures are necessary to satisfy the require-
ment that the owner employ ‘‘reasonable measures’’ to maintain secrecy 
of the information.63 
 
Practitioners and academics alike have long advocated for a federal trade secret 
law to clarify this confusing landscape and provide parity with other forms of intel-
lectual property already afforded federal protection.64 Indeed, the Defend Trade Se-
crets Act is not a revolutionary concept; it is the product of decades of advocacy and 
a rapidly changing technological landscape that has led to increasing theft of U.S. 
trade secrets. Moreover, the Defend Trade Secrets Act achieves its goal of providing 
a federal remedy by paying homage to, and incorporating, the legislative efforts of 
previous trade secret laws. Specifically, the Defend Trade Secrets Act amends the 
Economic Espionage Act to provide a civil remedy and bases its definition of “trade 
secret” off the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  
In short, the Defend Trade Secrets Act is both new and old—an amalgamation 
of existing law with a new federal application. There are five key differences between 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Defend Trade Secrets Act. First, the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act definition of “trade secret” builds on the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act definition by stating that trade secrets means all forms and types of financial, 
 
61 S. REP. NO. 114-220 (2016). 
62 See supra note 10. 
63 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2 (2016). 
64 See e.g., Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for A Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427 
(1995); see generally, Almeling, supra note 13.       
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business, scientific, technical, economic, and engineering information.65 The defini-
tion section of the Defend Trade Secrets Act also makes clear that trade secrets can 
be tangible or intangible regardless of how they are stored, compiled, or memorial-
ized, whether that is physically, electronically, graphically photographically, or in 
writing.66 Secondly, the term “improper means” expressly excludes certain conduct 
under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (reverse engineering, independent derivation or 
any other lawful means of acquisition).67 Third, the Defend Trade Secrets Act pro-
vides for an ex parte civil seizure order.68 Fourth, while the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act is not to be construed as pre-empting or displacing civil or criminal remedies 
under either federal or state law, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act expressly displaces 
other state law regarding trade secrets or misappropriation.69 Finally, although the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act provides for similar remedies as those afforded by the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act, the Defend Trade Secrets Act expressly states that no injunc-
tion can “prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship.”70 This 
Note focuses on this final distinction and is arguably why the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act may be a more attractive means to address trade secret misappropriation.  
B. Recent Application of the Defend Trade Secrets Act and its Interplay with 
State Non-Compete Provisions 
 Two recent cases highlight the evolving judicial interpretation of the newly 
enacted Defend Trade Secrets Act. To contrast treatment of injunctive relief by the 
courts and to highlight the dichotomy that is already developing, this section exam-
ines one case from California, a state that prohibits restraints on trade,71 and one case 
from Missouri, a state that does not prohibit restraints on trade. 72 Finally, this section 
examines a newly filed case in the Northern District of California and explores how 
that case may fit into the developing DTSA landscape.  
 The first court to enter a written opinion under the DTSA was the Northern 
District of California in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook.73 In that case, Henry Schein Inc. 
 
65 18 U.S.C. § 1836(3) (2016). 
66 Id. 
67 18 U.S.C. § 1836(6) (2016). 
68 The most contentious and arguably the most significant change from the UTSA to the DTSA is the inclusion 
of an ex parte civil seizure order which provides, “for expedited relief on an ex parte basis in the form of a 
seizure of property from the party accused of misappropriation, a remedy available under extraordinary circum-
stances where necessary to preserve evidence or prevent dissemination of a trade secret.” S. REP. NO. 114-220, 
at 3 (2016). The ex parte basis allows for a claimant to petition the court unchallenged for an injunctive order 
to prevent the dissemination of a trade secret. This is a radical departure from the equitable relief available under 
the UTSA.  
69 Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 7(a) (1985) (stating that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b), this [Act] displaces 
conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this State.”. 
70 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (2016). 
71 See generally, David R. Trossen, Edwards and Covenants Not to Compete in California: Leave Well Enough 
Alone, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539 (2009). 
57 See e.g., Whelan Sec. Co. v. Kennebrew, 379 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Mo. 2012) (“Missouri courts generally enforce 
a non-compete agreement if it is demonstratively reasonable.” (internal citations omitted)). 
73 2016 LEXIS 81369 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2016). See generally, Vann Pierce and Matthew Ingles, Early Returns 
(Part 3 of 3): California Federal Court First to Rule Under New Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, ORRICK 
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(“HSI”), a medical, dental, and veterinary supplies company originally sought a Tem-
porary Restraining Order (“TRO”) against a former employee, Ms. Jennifer Cook, 
before filing a complaint alleging trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA.74 
In the TRO proceeding, HSI alleged that before Ms. Cook left HSI to work for a 
competitor, she stole confidential information in violation of state and federal trade 
secret laws and in contravention of employment agreements she signed while em-
ployed with HSI.75 The court granted the TRO which, “enjoined [Cook] from, di-
rectly or indirectly, soliciting, continuing to solicit, initiating contact with, or accept-
ing business from, any HSI customers whose accounts were assigned to her while she 
was employed by HSI.”76 Two weeks later on June 22, 2016, the court granted HSI 
a preliminary injunction but repealed the customer contact restrictions on Ms. Cook 
in recognition of California case law and statutory law disfavoring restraints on trade, 
despite finding that HSI demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits regarding 
misappropriation of trade secrets under the DTSA.77  
 Conversely in July of 2016 in the Eastern district of Missouri, Panera sought 
and was granted a TRO to enjoin a former employee from working for a competitor 
based largely on that employee’s knowledge and potential use of Panera trade se-
crets.78 In that case, Panera, a corporation that owns and operates “bakery-café” stores 
sought to enjoin a former employee from working for the pizza company Papa 
John’s.79 Panera alleged that Michael Nettles, as Vice President of Architecture in 
Panera's Information Technology department, had access to valuable and confidential 
information, including Panera trade secrets.80 Panera sought a TRO to enjoin Nettles 
from employment with Papa John’s to prevent the disclosure of valuable trade se-
crets.81 The court found that, “Panera [was] likely to succeed on the merits of several 
of its claims, including … its request for injunctive relief in order to protect the dis-
closure of its confidential information and trade secrets.”82 The scope of the injunc-
tive relief granted in the TRO by the court barred Nettles from employment with Papa 
John’s, because, “Nettles’ immediate employment with Papa John’s is likely to lead 
to such disclosure [of trade secrets].83 
The difference between Panera and Henry Schein is clear. In states that disfavor 
or prohibit the enforcement of non-compete provisions, one of the most valuable and 
sought after remedies by plaintiffs is potentially unavailable—injunctive relief that 
acts as a constructive restraint on trade. Companies may prefer equitable relief in this 
 
TRADE SECRET WATCH BLOG, (June 30, 2016), http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2016/06/30/califor-
nia-federal-court-first-to-rule-under-new-defend-trade-secrets-act-of-2016/. 
74 See generally, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1079–80. 
77 2016 LEXIS 81369, at *6-7. 
78 Panera, LLC v. Nettles, No. 4:16-CV-1181-JAR, 2016 WL 4124114, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016). 
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Importantly, the court did not directly analyze the trade secret misappropriation claim under the DTSA frame-
work but instead noted that, “[a]lthough the Court's analysis has focused on Panera's Missouri trade secrets 
claim, an analysis under the Defend Trade Secrets Act would likely reach a similar conclusion.” Id. at 4, n. 2. 
82 Id. at 2.  
83 Id. at 4.  
  
 Journal of Legislation 303 
form because it most clearly represents the original intent of the restrictive covenant 
entered into by the departing employee or most effectively protects the valuable trade 
secret information imperiled by the departing employee. Often, a restraint on trade is 
the only way of preventing the inevitable disclosure84 of highly confidential and 
highly profitable trade secrets. If a company is denied the availability of injunctive 
relief, they are denied the most effective tool available. This is why the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, which does not contain a carve-out for states that disfavor or 
prohibit restraints on trade, may be a more effective tool for combating trade secret 
misappropriation—as it leaves open the option of injunctive relief in the form of a 
constructive restraint on trade.  
A recently filed case in the Northern District of California serves as an exemplar 
of the confusing landscape wrought by the various trade secret laws and the myriad 
considerations counsel must take into account when seeking both venue and remedy 
for an alleged trade secret misappropriation. On February 23, 2017, Waymo, LLC 
(“Waymo”) filed suit against Uber Technologies Inc. (“Uber”), alleging violation of 
both the DTSA and the California UTSA.85 Waymo, a Google Inc. subsidiary, spe-
cializes in driverless car technology.86 In its complaint against Uber, Waymo alleges 
that in January of 2016, Anthony Levandowski, a former manager at Waymo, stole 
confidential, proprietary information and trade secrets before departing Waymo to 
form his own company that would eventually be bought by Uber for $680 million.87 
Waymo alleges that. “[i]n December 2015, Mr. Levandowski specifically searched 
for and then installed specialized software onto his company-issued laptop in order 
to access the server that stores these particular files. Once Mr. Levandowski accessed 
this server, he downloaded the 14,000 files, representing approximately 9.7 GB of 
highly confidential data.”88 Waymo further alleges that, “[a] number of Waymo em-
ployees subsequently also left to join Anthony Levandowski’s new business, down-
loading additional Waymo trade secrets in the days and hours prior to their departure. 
These secrets included confidential supplier lists, manufacturing details and state-
ments of work with highly technical information.”89  
These allegations are important for several reasons. First, although Waymo did 
not discover the alleged misappropriation until some months later and is not pursuing 
a claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the allegation that Levandowski 
had to install specialized software to access the files he allegedly stole could be a 
basis for “exceeding authorized access” under the CFAA in jurisdictions that recog-
nize the CFAA as a means of redress for trade secret misappropriation by internal 
employees. Had Waymo discovered the alleged misappropriation sooner and filed 
for a TRO, Levandowski could have potentially been enjoined from forming his new 
company and using the allegedly misappropriated trade secrets. Unfortunately, this 
route would have been rife with challenges because this suit is being brought in the 
 
84 For a discussion on the inevitable disclosure doctrine, see PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
85 Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc. et al, No. 3:17-cv-00939, (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 23, 2017).  
86 See generally, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/.  
87 See generally, Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Pl’s Compl.”), ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 1-8.  
88 Id. at ¶ 4.  
89 Id. at ¶ 6. 
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Northern District of California, in which case Nosal controls. Because Nosal and the 
Ninth Circuit interpretation of the CFAA controls, it would prevent interpretation of 
the CFAA to apply to internal employee hacking as a means to redress trade secret 
misappropriation. Thus, even though the trade secrets at issue here were allegedly 
accessed by electronic means, and even though using the CFAA would allow Waymo 
to file suit in California without having to consider California’s prohibition on re-
straints of trade, counsel for Waymo is limited to the UTSA and DTSA because of 
the unresolved circuit split and the Ninth Circuit’s decision to not allow the CFAA 
to be applied to internal employees when they exceed authorized access.   
Moreover, because this suit is being brought in the Northern District of Califor-
nia for violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act, counsel for Waymo will be con-
strained by the DTSA provision which prevents any injunction from “conflict[ing] 
with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profes-
sion, trade, or business….”).90 As examined in the discussion on Panera, this is not 
a consideration in states that do not prohibit restraints on trade. Thus, while the DTSA 
provides federal subject matter jurisdiction in this case, it is arguably undercut by the 
venue’s prohibition on restraints of trade.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The purported goal of the Defend Trade Secrets Act was to bring order to chaos, 
to harmonize the variances in judicial interpretation of the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act, and to empower private litigants with a new federal cause of action. This goal is 
severely curtailed by the state non-compete carve-out, which hamstrings a plaintiff’s 
use of injunctive relief where it might run afoul of state non-compete provisions. 
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook demonstrates how seriously limiting state policies disfa-
voring non-competes can be on the efficacy of injunctive relief when pursued under 
the Defend Trade Secrets Act. Given recent trends and White House initiatives (dis-
cussed supra) to persuade state lawmakers to oppose enforcement of non-compete 
provisions, the Defend Trade Secret Act could end up being as ineffective at unifying 
trade secret law as previous attempts at standardization have been.  
Moreover, given business’s increasing reliance on electronic storage, it is likely 
that most future trade secret misappropriation cases will involve electronic access. 
Therefore, it may be preferable when bringing an action in a state that prohibits or 
disfavors enforcement of non-compete provisions to proceed under the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act rather than run the risk of potentially losing injunctive relief 
under the Defend Trade Secrets Act. However, as examined in the counterfactual 
situation with the ongoing Waymo lawsuit, even this may not be a viable option until 
 
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(3)(A)(i)(I-II) (2016), which states: “In a civil action brought under this subsection with 
respect to the misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may … grant an injunction … to prevent any actual or 
threatened misappropriation described in paragraph (1) on such terms as the court deems reasonable, provided 
the order does not … prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and that conditions placed 
on such employment shall be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the infor-
mation the person knows; or … otherwise conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the 
practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business….” 
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the Supreme Court reconciles the circuit split regarding whether an internal employee 
can be liable for violation of the CFAA when accessing trade secrets.  
As more cases are decided under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and more states 
join the trend of prohibiting or disfavoring enforcement of non-compete provisions, 
it may exacerbate the potential irrelevance of the Defend Trade Secrets Act as a via-
ble means for employers to prohibit the post-employment actions of its former em-
ployees and protect valuable trade secrets which encourage innovation and propel 
our economy forward.  
 
